This paper investigates how market participants react to mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving telecommunications companies. The empirical evidence suggests that such activities convey bad news to the market. This is consistent with the synergy trap hypothesis and extant empirical findings of value-reducing diversification strategies in recent literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous M&As have recently taken place in the telecommunications industry, primarily in the United States and Europe. This wave of M&As is related to three historically significant events that affected market structure and competition: 1) The Revision of the American Telecommunications Act in 1996, 2) A WTO Agreement in 1997, and 3) The Integration of the European Union in 1998. Among these events, the WTO agreement triggered a worldwide competition in the telecommunications industry by reducing the entry barrier to the telecommunications markets of foreign countries, thereby resulting in the movement of global M&As. Unfortunately, however, as the industry has become more privatized and liberalized, there has been a significant increase in competition and an ensuing decrease in profitability. Given the vastness of the industry, experts conjecture that this poor configuration will eventually lead to its globalization. This trend is already apparent with the increase in cross-border investments.
It is commonly believed that M&As strengthen businesses by making their operations more synergistic. 1) However, a large number of empirical studies have actually demonstrated that M&As have either a negative effect on business performance or simply no effect at all (e.g., [2] - [5] ). For example, AT&T recently acquired TCI cable in order to develop a bundled digital phone service. However, evidence suggests that this acquisition has yet to bring about any synergism or for that matter, any other benefits to AT&T business operations. One explanation 1) Similarly, Ferris and Park [1] assert that mergers in the telecommunication industry often involve information technology firms, implying the potential for value creation and superior long-term performance. However, they find that shareholders of the acquiring firm suffer a wealth loss of nearly 20% over the 1990-1994 post-merger period.
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Myeong-Cheol Park, Dong-Hoon Yang, Changi Nam, and Young-Wook Ha for this may be that bundling requires sufficient products and infrastructure [6] . Also, unlike the context of traditional industries, modern businesses, such as the telecommunications sector, that operate within dynamic environments of frequent technical and regulatory changes, market globalization, productmarket redefinition, and competitive entry, may gain little market power and efficiency by attempting to concentrate a dynamic industry through a M&A [7] . The first objective of this study is to empirically examine investors' reaction to M&As in the telecommun-ications industry.
Recent anecdotal evidence indicates that the failure of M&As to create synergy is prevalent in the international context. Very and Schweiger [8] , for example, document that in cross-border acquisitions the acquiring firms would likely be operating in a new environment characterized by difference in languages, cultures, laws, and socioeconomic conditions. Such differences may make access to information to forecast revenues, costs, assets, and liabilities difficult to garner and interpret. Consequently, if pricing is based on unrealistically high projections or cash flows that cannot be achieved after an acquisition, then the price paid was too high and value is not created or lost. In his discussion about the synergy trap, Sirower [5] argues that synergy rarely justifies the premium paid, and many acquisition premiums require performance improvements that are virtually impossible to realize even for the best managers in the best of the industry conditions. The second objective of this study is to investigate whether a presumed synergy trap exists, particularly in cross-border M&As.
Using a sample of forty-two cases of worldwide M&A deals in the telecommunications industry for the 1997-2000 period, we found evidence of an unfavorable (negative) market reaction to those activities. This is consistent with the synergy trap hypothesis and extant empirical findings of value-reducing diversification strategies in finance literature.
2) Our results also indicate that the unfavorable market reaction is mainly driven by international M&A activities, supporting the hypothesis that acquirers' lack of proper information about target countries causes poor performance by a failure to adequately manage the acquisition process. Further, our evidence of negative impacts on the bidder's business after an M&A reinforces our main finding that market participants, on average, perceive M&A activities to be detrimental to shareholder value. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize the recent trend of M&As in the telecommunications industry. We review the prior research and provide rationals for our hypotheses in the third section. The fourth section describes data sources, sampling designs and methodology. The fifth section provides the empirical results and discussions associated with these hypotheses. The final section summarizes the findings and presents the conclusions of the study.
2) Denis, Denis, and Sarin [9] summarize recent finance literature documenting significant value losses associated with corporate diversification strategies including M&A.
II. THE TREND OF WORLDWIDE M&As IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
The recent M&A trend in the world telecommunications market was caused by three significant events as well as by the ongoing regulatory liberalization and privatization of the industry. These changes have brought about fierce competition and ensuing decreases in profit in both the domestic and crossborder telecommunications service markets. We begin by summarizing worldwide M&As during the past decade and then reviewing potential motives for M&As in other industries which can also be applicable to the telecommunications service industry.
United States: The recent wave of M&As in the American telecommunications market is associated with the Telecommunication Act of 1996. One of the main objectives of the new act was to enhance competition in the local telephone service market by allowing long-distance telephone service providers to enter the local market and vice versa. Examples of major acquisitions after the Telecommunication Act of 1996 are as follows: a) WorldCom and MCI: They merged to compete with AT&T in the long-distance market.
b) SBC and Ameritech: They merged to geographically extend SBC's operations to the western part of the U.S.
As a result, the U.S. telecommunications market is now composed of AT&T, WorldComMCI, Sprint, and two or three RBOC (Regional Bell Operating Company) groups. Most likely, these firms will try to become providers of a full range of telecommunication services including wireline and wireless telephony, and Internet.
European Union: The liberalization of the world's telecommunications market is related to deregulation and free competition in the European Union (EU) and was triggered by external factors that the U.S. insisted upon in order to open the EU telecommunications market in the 1980s. Before the liberalization of the telecommunications market, most of the EU member states monopolized their markets with the aid of government controls.
Three basic principles determined by the EU Committee were applied to all member countries: 1) the extension of importing competition in a monopolized area, 2) the harmoniza-tion of the European Market, and 3) the application of general competition rules in the EU telecommunications service market. The M&A wave in the EU started in the Scandinavian peninsular and spread to Germany, the UK and France. As a result, Germany, the UK and France became dominant in the EU telecommunications industry.
Asia: Unlike in the US and Europe, there have not been active cross-border M&As in Asia. Several telecommunications enterprises, however, initiated M&As to extend their market power regionally. For example, DDI, KDD and IDO merged in 2000 to better serve the Japanese telecommunications market that had grown considerably due to its deregulations and technological developments. Also, Singapore Telecom announced the acquisition of Hong Kong Telecom in 2000 to take a major role in the Asian market that was being reformed as a central force in Japan and China. At the same time, more and more penetration into the Asian market by US and European telecommunication enterprises is expected in the near future.
The review of the recent trend of M&A in the telecommunications industry reveals the following noteworthy characteristics. First, strategic alliances among huge telecommunication enterprises that were popular in the early 1990s have been replaced by M&As. In general, a strategic alliance in the telecommunications industry was helpful when direct investments were difficult due to government regulations. With worldwide deregulation, however, a strategic alliance is no longer the best solution for a telecommunications firm. Second, after a significant part of the entry barriers between regions and/or countries was eliminated, it was much more difficult for small and local telecommunication firms to enjoy profitability, even in niche markets, without joining the mega-carriers. Third, the loosening of regional and national barriers in the market, and ongoing integration of fixed and mobile networks forced telecommunication firms to become integrated service providers offering not only telephony services but also data communication services such as the Internet. Finally, cross-border M&As became prevalent when telecommunications service firms without a global network could not continue to meet users' needs, including international data communication services.
III. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we begin by reviewing potential motives for M&As in general. Gitman [10] argued that the goal of M&As is the maximization of the owner's wealth as reflected in the acquirer's share price. Thus, specific motives of M&As, including growth or diversification, synergy, fund raising, increased managerial skill or technology, tax considerations, increased ownership liquidity, and defense against takeover, are assumed to be consistent with owner wealth maximization.
In a related study, Hopkins [11] classifies the motives of M&As suggested in prior studies as four distinct but related motives: strategic, market, economic, and personal motives. Strategic motive is concerned with improving the strength of a firm's strategy, e.g., creating synergy, utilizing a firm's core competence, increasing market power, providing the firm with complimentary resources, products, and strengths [12] . Market motive aims at entering new markets in new areas or countries by acquiring already established firms as the fastest way, or as a way to gain entry without adding additional capacity to the market that already may have its full capacity. Establishing economies of scale is included in economic motives; the agency problem and management hubris are included in personal motives. Ghoshal [13] developed a framework encompassing a range of different issues relevant to global strategies describing international M&As. He maintains that several sources of competitive advantages can be strategic motives for international M&As: national differences, scale economies, and scope economies.
Notwithstanding purported potential motives for M&As, three particular but not mutually exclusive problems related to international mergers and acquisitions are worth noting from past empirical research: inspection problem, negotiation problem, and integration problem [11] . The inspection problem states that information asymmetry between a buyer and seller often results in the buyer paying more than the seller's intended offer price. The information asymmetry induces the bidder to place a higher value on the target to be sold. The negotiation problem particularly pertains to international M&As due to the inherent complex process of cross-border deals arising from acquirers' lack of information about the target country and cultural differences. Furthermore, the integration process of a merged firm negatively affects the acquiring firm involved in a crossborder M&As. It has been estimated that a third of all merger failures are caused by a system integration problem [14] .
As such, despite alleged benefits from M&As by acquiring firms, extant literature appears to document evidence that mergers result in negative synergy. We argue that this negative impact on acquiring firms can be exacerbated in the telecommunications industry and particularly in cross-border M&As.
From the above discussion, we posit the following hypotheses (stated in alternative forms):
Hypothesis 1: Stock market reacts negatively to M&As.
Hypothesis 2: Negative market reaction to M&As is more prevalent in cross-border M&As than in domestic M&As.
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE SELECTION 1. Empirical Model for Residual Analysis
To gain insight into investors' perceptions of the telecommunications firms' M&As, we studied the stock market's reaction towards the acquisition announcements (i.e., announcement period). Previous research conducted a residual analysis of the impact of an M&A event on the rate of return of the stockholder.
3) The key feature of this event study framework was to eliminate market influence from the rate of return on a security during the event time period. This left an abnormal return that could represent the effect of the M&A specific information. One concern that complicates event studies arises from leakage of information. Leakage occurs when information regarding a relevant event is released to a small group of investors before official public release. In this case, the stock price might start to increase days or weeks before the official announcement date. Any abnormal return on the announcement date is then a poor indicator of the total impact of the information release. A better indicator would be the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which captures the total firm-specific stock movement for an entire period when the market might be responding to new information. Following this analytical framework, we examined cumulative abnormal returns around M&A announcement dates.
3) An event study is called a residual analysis. Residual means the remaining effect after the elimination of market effect.
The market model was utilized to find an influence of the M&A on the abnormal return of each firm in the telecommunications service industry.
4) The market model asserted that returns on security j are linearly related to returns on a market portfolio. This is described by We first estimated the coefficients (a j and b j ) of each stock by using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method. The market model of each stock was estimated over a 100-day period beginning 140-days prior to each M&A announcement date. Once the parameters had been estimated, then the abnormal return (AR) for each sample firm was estimated for the announcement period (i.e., test period) that includes announcement date (day 0) and other days of interest (e.g., "day -30" prior to the announcement or "day +1" after the announcement):
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of abnormal returns for each sample firm for the announcement period from day t 0 to day t 1 .
If stock prices reflect all currently available information fol-4) As an alternative to the market model, CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) can be used as the correct process to explain the underlying distribution of returns over the event period. The choice as to which model is used to estimate the abnormal return really depends on which generating procedure is the appropriate model for the reality. lowing the semi-strong form version of the efficient market hypothesis, then the impact of the publicly announced information, such as an M&A announcement, can be measured using this abnormal return. If sample firms are grouped into portfolios in a manner randomizing all other effects, then the portfolio average residual can be interpreted as a wealth effect due to the M&A. In other words, if there were no abnormal changes in the value of the firm associated with the M&A activity, we should observe no pattern in the residuals. They would fluctuate around zero and on average would equal zero. Appropriate tests can be used to determine whether such measured wealth effects differ significantly from zero. For this purpose, t-statistics was used to assess the statistical significance of CAR and constructed as follows:
where N is the number of firms, and S is the estimated standard deviation of the CAR.
Sample Selection Procedure
We located the announcement dates of M&As in the telecommunications service industry for the 1997-2000 period at BusinessWire.Com. Financial data, such as revenue and net incomes of the sample firms, was collected from Hoover's Inc. and the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC). The daily stock price of each firm and the stock market index such as the Dow Jones Index and the Nasdaq Index was obtained from Yahoo! Inc. We considered only firms classified as either one of the following industries by Hoover's Inc.: 1) Local Telecom & Private Transmission Services, 2) Long-Distance Carriers, and 3) Wireless Communications Services. To restrict our attention to the investors' perceptions of the recent telecommunications firm's M&A, we eliminated the firms that announced their M&As before 1996. This resulted in a final sample of 42 firm-event observations of acquiring firms.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Main Findings
Estimation results of investors' reactions to the M&As sur-rounding their announcement dates are reported in Table 1 and Table 2 . These tables present average CARs, standard deviation, and t-value for each announcement period in which day zero is the announcement date. Partially consistent with the hypothesis that the stock market reacts negatively to M&A announcements, the results in Table 1 show that the CARs from day -30 to day +5 and from day -30 to day 0 are -0.117 and -0.085, respectively, and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For the return window of [-5, 5] , the market reaction is still negative and significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. However, we were unable to find significantly negative investors' reactions to the announcements for the shorter return windows of [-5,0] , [-3, 3] , [-3, 0] , [-1, 1] , and [-1, 0] .
At this point, we considered two potential reasons for the somewhat inconsistent results for different announcement periods (i.e., return windows). First, shorter return windows may not be appropriate to reveal investors' reactions to the M&As due to information leakage. This is particularly plausible in that M&As involving telecommunications firms are routinely exposed to broad debates before their announcements due to their public nature of business and regulatory concerns. In other words, investors are likely to be informed of the event well before the official M&A announcement, thereby resulting in early market reaction. Second, a small sample size of 42 observations may have prohibited us from detecting consistent results. A larger sample size is necessary when conducting an event study because it helps to distinguish the pure announcement effect in a short period of time.
Collectively, however, our results indicate that M&A announcements by telecommunications firms are, on average, perceived as bad news by the market. As discussed in the preceding paragraph, our results largely support the synergy trap hypothesis that predicts a negative market reaction to M&A announcements.
Next, we provide evidence that the significance of the synergy trap hypothesis is mainly driven by a sub sample of international M&As. The results in Table 3 , where CARs and corresponding t-statistics with international M&A announcements are reported, are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 2 except that the CAR for the return window of [-5, 5] loses its statistical significance. In contrast to these results, Table 4 shows that market reactions to domestic M&A announcements are statistically insignificant. We perform a t-test to compare the market reactions to international versus domestic M&As and find the difference (International CAR -Domestic CAR) is statistically negative at the 10 percent level for the return windows of [-30,5] and [-30,0] . Hence, the results in Table 3 -Table 5 support our second hypothesis that negative market reaction to M&As is more prevalent in cross-border M&As than in domestic M&As.
Our test results are consistent with those in prior research by demonstrating that an M&A has an adverse impact on the investors' perceptions of the acquiring firm's performance. Researchers provide two common explanations for why M&A announcements convey bad news to market participants. First, as Sirower [5] argued, expected synergy rarely justifies the premium paid and many acquisitions' premiums require performance improvements that are virtually impossible to realize even for the best managers in the best of industry conditions. 5) Second, as maintained by Reed and Lajoux [15] , M&A deals will become more complex as crossborder cultural, financial, and monetary effects are factored in, as mergers "go international". 6) A recent survey by Arthur
Anderson [16] also indicated that two-thirds of businesses in the fields of technology, media and communications report that M&As generate negative impacts on their business. This is caused by a lack of success in overcoming systems and cultural integration issues and resistance to change that is usually prevalent in a cross-border M&A.
The same problems associated with M&As in general are also found in the telecommunications industry. In spite of these problems, telecommunications firms are still actively pursuing M&As to reap benefits such as decreased average cost and increased network externality from having an economy of scale and a global network. 7) 2. Post-M&A Performance of the Acquiring Firms To further investigate whether an observed negative market reaction is supported by the acquiring firm's performance during the subsequent period, we examined changes in revenue, operating income and net income of the bidder. Considering that the most commonly cited benefits of successful deals relate to the acquisition of technology and growth in size, the results in Table 6 appear to support the notion. Revenue of each acquiring firm increased as expected. However, a majority of the bidder firms experienced decreases in both operating income and net income performance measures. Regarding operating income, 10 out of the 17 M&A deals experienced negative changes during the subsequent 5) In the equation of "Expected Performance = Expected NPV = Expected SynergyPremium", the expected performance is positive only when the expected synergy is higher than the premium paid.
6) In addition, the integration problem may more serious when the M&A is going international. 7) A network externality exists when the amount that one party is willing to pay for access to a network depends on who or how many other parties are connected to it. year. 8) This tendency becomes slightly more apparent for net income: 11 out of 17 deals exhibited negative changes in net income. Thus, our evidence of negative impacts on the bidders' business after an M&A reinforced our main finding that market participants, on average, perceive M&As to be detrimental to the shareholder's value. Our results also suggested that value creation or synergy realization through M&A deals is not warranted even though it may increase the firm's size. Our findings are consistent with those reported by Ferris and Park [1] where acquiring telecommunications firms are found to experience post-merger underperformance.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examined how market participants react to M&As involving telecommunication firms. Consistent with the synergy trap hypothesis that predicts a negative market reaction to an M&A announcement, our results show that the acquiring firms' average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding M&A announcements are negative. The analysis also supports the hypothesis that cross-border M&A deals are the main instigator of negative market reaction. Further, our evidence of negative impacts on the bidder's operating performance in the form of changes in revenues and net income after an M&A reinforces our main finding that market participants, on average, interpret M&As by telecommunications firms as bad news. This study makes two major contributions to the extant literature. First, it sheds light on the validity of the recent wave of M&As in the telecommunication industry by providing evidence to suggest that synergy and shareholder's market value creation are not necessarily associated with M&As. Second, negative market reaction driven mainly by international M&As provides additional support for the assertion that a lack of success in overcoming systems and cultural integration issues plays a critical role in the failures of M&As (e.g., Arthur Anderson [16] ).
